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FOREWORD 
This paper was not written at IIASA; but the first author, Professor Ayres, is currently an 
active IIASA staff member. In view of IIASA's long record of significant contributions to 
both risk analysis and environmental problem-solving, it seems likely that many members 
of the IIASA community, past and present, will be interested in this paper. Hence, it is 
being reprinted for convenient dissemination, with the kind permission of the original 
publisher. 
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Bhopal 
Lessons for Technological Decision-Makers 
Robert U. Ayres and Pradeep K. Rohatgi 
ABSTRACT. The accidental release of methyl isocyanate (MIC) on December 2 and 3, I984, 
at the Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) pesticide manufactun'ng plant in Bhopal, India, 
killed at least I, 750 people, and probably as many as 2,500, 1 while i'njun'ng 50,000 or more. 
This episode appears likely to mark a watershed in the histon'cal relationships between 
scientists, corporations, governments and communities. Among the many assumptions that 
will have to be questioned and reconsidered in the wake of this disaster are the following: 
that it is possible, in pn'nciple, to know enough in advance about a complex chemical pro-
cess to design a totally safe system; that it is possible, in principle, for human workers to 
operate such a system safely; that it is possible, in principle, for a public agency to regulate 
such a system effectively (even if it could be designed); and that "fault" in the legal sense 
can be meaningfully attn'buted to one among the van'ous actors in the event of a complex 
system failure. The above questions all an'se prominently in connection with the Bhopal 
tragedy. This paper recounts the key factors insofar as they are known, commenting on the 
information avatlable to van'ous parties and the decisions that were made. Some general 
conclusions are drawn at the end. 
Methyl isocyanate (MIC), formula CH3 -N=C=O, is an ester of isocyanic acid 
(HNCO) . It was first made from phosgene and methylamine hydrochloride in the 
liquid phase by Gatterman and Schmidt in 1888 , and studied intensively by Slotta 
et al. 2 , in the laboratories ofIG Farbenindustrie A. G., the German chemical cartel. 
Work on the isocyanates was largely centered in Germany until after World War 
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II, when US and British firms were given access to the research of I. G . Farben, 3 and 
the cartel was broken up by the occupation authorities. Interest in practical applica-
tions of isocyanates grew rapidly, and other chemical firms, including Montecatini 
in Italy, Monsanto , and Union Carbide (UCC) in the US, became actively involved . 
Isocyanates contain the unsaturated -N = C = 0 group, which accounts for their 
high reactivity. MIC monomer per se is the basis of a number of insecticides, in-
cluding Aldicarb ("Temik"), Baygon, Carbary! ("Sevin"), and Carbofuran 
("Furaden"), and is also a route to the production of polyurethanes, which are 
widely used in foams, varnishes and plastics. 4 Union Carbide Corporation is one of 
the two major US producers, mainly from its plant in Institute , West Virginia, near 
Charleston, which began production about 1967. The only other significant US 
producer is FMC Corporation. Bayer A.G., a successor of I.G . Farben, also pro-
duces MIC in Dormagen, Federal Republic of Germany, and in Antwerp, Belgium. 
Production in Bhopal by UCIL using UCC technology began on a small scale in 
1977-78 (see Figure 1). Production by UCC in the US in 1980 was about 20,000 
tonnes , compared to 1,000 tonnes produced by Union Carbide India Limited at 
peak output . Demand-hence production-dropped sharply after 1981, and the 
Bhopal plant was operating at barely half its capacity when the accident occurred 
on the night of December 2/3 , 1984. 
Chemistry 
Several phosgene-based manufacturing processes are described in the literature . 5 In 
one, monomethylamine (CH3NH3 ) reacts in the gas phase with phosgene (COC1 2) 
at about 275° C without a catalyst, yielding a mixture of MIC (CH3NCO) and HCl, 
which subsequently recombines in the low temperature condenser (25°) to yield 
methyl carbamoyl chloride (CH3NHCOC1) or MCC . The MIC can then be 
recovered by thermally decomposing the MCC and preferentially removing the 
HCl, e.g. , by heating with lime as in the original process of Gatterman and 
Schmidt or by reacting with pyridine at 115 • . 6 The proprietary process reportedly 
used by UCC apparently occurs in the liquid phase : Phosgene is passed into 
monomethyl amide MMA solution in an inert solvent (e.g. , chloroform) at 
30° -50° where the reaction takes place and MIC is released as vapor and collected. 7 
The Bayer process does not start from phosgene , but from dimethyl urea and 
di phenyl carbonate. 8 MIC has the basic structure CH3 - N = C = 0. 
It is volatile (boiling point 39°C) and the vapor is heavier than air (vapor density 
2.0) . It is rated as highly toxic (TLV = .02ppm) , highly flammable, and quite 
unstable , with a near maximum combined health-fire-stability hazard rating of 
4-4-3 . (By comparison , phosgene has a rating of 4-0-2 with a TLV of .01 ppm, 
while carbon monixide has a rating of 4-4-1 with a TL V of 50 ppm . )9 
Carbamates are esters of carbam.ic acid. The carbamate insecticides are synthesized 
by reacting MIC with phenols or naphthols . There is an alternative route that 
begins with a vapor phase reaction of phenol or naphthol with phosgene, followed 
by reaction with MMA. Ironically , this has been rejected by the chemical industry 
in favor of the use of liquid MIC, because it would require gaseous phosgene to be 
kept in storage. The basic carbamylation reaction is 
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CH3-N=C=O + ROH - CHrN-C-RO + OH 
The reaction of MIC with water is important in regard to the statements that 
follow. There are three major routes leading to monomethylamide (MMA), 1,3 
dimethylurea and 1,3,5 trimethylbiuret respectively: 
and 
The mix of reaction products depends upon the relative concentration of MIC and 
water. A small amount of water added to liquid MIC is likely to produce 
trimethylbiuret predominantly. Both of the latter two compounds are said to be 
relatively harmless. It is important, however, to note that large amounts of heat are 
produced., viz., 580 BTU per pound of MIC or 3,700 BTU per pound ofH20 . Thus 
one major hazard in handling MIC is contact with water. 
Another important set of reactions are the polymerization reactions. According to 
one hypothesis, assuming the standard anionic initiation mechanism, an anion "X" 
attacks the MIC molecule forming an MIC nitrogen anion. 
This, in turn, can subsequently react with another MIC molecule, and then a 
third, yielding the linear trimer: 
0 0 0 
II II II 
N<->-C-N-C-N-C-X 
I I I 
CH3 CH3 CH3 
The chain can be terminated as a cyclic trimer (releasing the initiating anion in 
the process) or it can continue to grow linearly . The heat of formation of the linear 
polymer is 345 BTU per pound. It is an amorphous solid (actually a substituted 
form of nylon 1). The cyclic trimer has the structure: 
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It is a crystalline solid with heat of formation of 540 BTU per pound. Generally 
speaking, at low initiator concentrations and I or temperatures an amorphous 
polymer form is favored, while at higher temperatures/concentrations the crystalline 
trimer form is favored. The rapidity of the process and the path (i.e., to trimer or 
polymer) is very sensitive, however, to the presence of catalysts. Many metallic 
chlorides and alkoxides are known to catalyze polymerization. Ferric chloride 
(FeCL3) is kn9wn to be particularly active. Chloride ions (from any source) can act 
as initiators. Weak organic bases, such as tertiary amines, can also apparently 
catalyze resinous (linear) polymerization. 
In fact, there is apparently some evidence that "ultrapure" MIC may be capable 
of auto-catalytic (self) polymerization. The mechanism has apparently not been 
determined, but it is known to be strongly temperature dependent . Trimerization 
proceeds up to 200 times faster at 2 5 ° C than at 0 •. 10 This explains the importance 
of refrigeration in MIC storage which will be discussed later. 
In contrast to "pure" MIC, there is evidence that "commercial-grade" MIC is 
quite difficult to polymerize, although specifications are not given in any published 
source. In fact, when UCC began production in 1967, only one compound (hex-
amethylene triamine) was known to be an effective polymerization catalyst. 11 On 
the other hand , a number of possible catalysts that were tested in the lab were 
ineffective . No case of autocatalytic polymerization of the commercial-grade MIC 
was known to have occurred prior to Bhopal. This fosters the supposition that con-
taminants normally found in commercial-grade MIC tend to act as stabilizers or in-
hibitors. Unfortunately, neither the stabilizing contaminants nor the mechanism 
have ever been precisely identified, although UCC conducted some research in the 
hope of finding inhibitors . 12 
Commercial-grade MIC, as produced by UCC, typically contained contaminants, 
including methylene chloride (CH2Cl), chloroform (CHCl3) , carbon tetrachloride 
(CCl4), MCC (CHNHCOCl), and phosgene (COCl2). Much attention has been 
focused on the role of phosgene, in particular, as an inhibitor of the polymeriza-
tion reaction. Its concentration in commercial-grade MIC is said to average about 
200-300 ppm, although the range in different samples can vary by nearly an order 
of magnitude. The comparative stability of commercial-grade MIC was generally 
attributed to the presence of trace amounts of phosgene, although the exact mech-
anism by which inhibition could occur remains quite obscure. 13 
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The role of MCC traces is also unclear, since MCC can decompose to MIC and 
HCl by the reaction 
RNHCOCl - R-N=C=O + HCl, 
leaving excess chloride ions. It is known that this mechanism can initiate polymeriza-
tion of the MIC in the presence of carbon steel, although it is apparently inhibited 
by the presence of methyl pyrophosphoric acid (UCC patent, 1970). 
Safety Features Embodied in the System at Bhopal 
Based on the known reactivity of pure MIC, especially in the presence of zinc, tin, 
copper and iron, UCC's operating manual14 specified bulk storage in drums or 
tanks of stainless steel (type 304 or 316), or steel lined with nickel or (pin-hole free) 
glass. In practice, only stainless steel seems to have been used, both for tanks and 
drums . Tubes and containers for sampling could be made of chlorofluorinated 
plastics (Teflon or Kel-F). Contact with any other materials, including plastics , was 
strictly prohibited . 
Instructions for bulk storage of MIC specified underground tanks (SS 304 or 361) 
encased in concrete . Further requirements included: 
• Tank size to be at least double the maximum volume to be stored , or a 
stand-by tank to be available; 
• Inert atmosphere (nitrogen gas) at 2-10 psi over atmospheric pressure ; 
• Refrigeration to maintain a temperature near o·c (certainly, below 15°C); 
• Coolants must not react with MIC (chloroform or one of the chlorofluoro-
carbons are acceptable) ; 
• Regular, scheduled inspection and cleaning of valves and piping is im-
perative; and 
• Storage time was limited to 12 months maximum. 
The UCC operating manual stressed the toxicity and hazardous nature of MIC, 
including the fact that exposure could lead to fatal pulmonary edema, and 
specified the use of protective rubber suits and air-breathing equipment for person-
nel engaged in sampling or testing operations where some possibility of a leak or 
spill might exist. 
In the Bhopal plant of UCIL, there were three double-walled stainless steel MIC 
tanks , each capable of holding 60 tonnes of liquid. These were designated Tanks 
610 , 611 and 619. The tanks were designed to be refrigerated and interconnected 
so that MIC in tank 610 (which leaked) could have been bled into Tank 619 .15 All 
these tanks were also embedded in concrete, as shown in Figure 1. The major pipe 
connections to Tank 610 are shown in Figure 2. 
In addition to the refrigeration system and stand-by tank, there were four back-
up safety systems, shown schematically in Figure 3. 16 There were : 
• A vent gas caustic scrubber, capable of neutralizing about eight tonnes of 
MIC per hour at full capacity.(Figure 4 and Figure 5). 
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FIGURE 1. MIC Storage Tanks 
• A flare tower, designed to burn escaping gases from the scrubber and/or the 
MIC unit itself, also shown in Figure 5. 
• A "water curtain," capable of "knocking down" small amounts of escaping 
MIC which were not neutralized by the scrubber or the flare up to 12-15 
meters above the ground. The jets could reach as high as 35 meters, but only 
if operated individually. 
• A siren, intended to alert the staff and the surrounding community in the 
event of an uncontrolled leak. 
The operating technicians hired when the plant was first built (1977) were 
reportedly graduates in chemistry or chemical engineering with the equivalent of at 
least two years of college (US equivalent), plus a six-month training period pro-
vided by Union Carbide. 17 Educational standards and staffing levels were relaxed 
somewhat in recent years when the Bhopal plant began losing money. 
Chronology of Events the Night of December 2 I 3 
At the time of the accident, the refrigeration system had been disconnected for 
several months, apparently to save electric power. Although the MIC operating 
manual specified a maximum of 15°C, the "normal" temperature in the tanks was 
reportedly around 20°. The vent gas scrubber was also down for maintenance at the 
time of the accident, and its supply of caustic soda was allegedly low. In addition, 
the gas vent flare was disconnected, and one section of the pipe leading to it had 
To VGS +--·- RVVH line 
---f - ----{> (Maximum height 20 feet) - ----{> 
..... ..... 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I~ 
f 
I I :l 
<r- - l t 
To VGS ..... 16 :-i-1Height 8 to 10 feet) 
17 
Key: 
1. Interconnection RVVH 
isolation valve 
2. Interconnection PVH isolation 
valve 
3. PV H isolation valve 
4. Blow down OMV 
5. Make up OMV 
6. Check valve for nitrogen Ii ne 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
} 
Quench filter 
pressure safety valve l ines 
(at ground level) 
} 
Phosgene stri .pp ing still 
filter pressure 
safety valve hnes 
(at ground level) 
Nitrogen header isolation valve 
RVVH isolation valve 
RVVH bleeder valve 
Relief valve for MIC tank 
First RVVH isolation valve for 
MIC tank 
First PVH isolation valve for 
MIC tank 
+-- - - ToVGS 
----<> 
To VGS and FVH 
t 
..... 
13. Rupture disk 
14. PIC isolation valve 
+-- - · - RVVH line 
------<> 
PVH line 
-
jumper line 1,1 2 
. 13 
I .:, 
From refrigeration 
Concrete cover 
To reactor conditioner 
Pyroliser conditioner 
or vent scrubber 
llJ... 22, 23, 24, 25. Bleeder valves 
,.. RVVH - relief valve vent header 
PVH - process valve vent header 
VGS - Vent gas scrubber 
llJ... 15. Pl isolation valve 
,..16. RVVH isolation valve 
17. Valve from which water for 
flushing was let in 
FVH - flare vent header 
MRS - MIC reactor side 
18, 19, 20, 21. Down-stream 
isolation valves for filters 
- --{> Route of water ingress 
<0- - . Route of gas leakage before 0030 hrs 
~ Route of gas leakage after 0030 hrs 
FIGURE 2. RVVH and Bleeder Values 
Source: Business India 2(25): 3-10 (1985) 
~ 
~ ~ 
~ ~ 
~ 
~ 
.., 
~ 
... 
!:;· (5· 
;$ 
~ ~ 
~ 
~ 
26 
Flare 
tower 
From MIC 
unit 
Riff rig-
eration 
Robert U. Ayres and Pradeep K. Rohatgi 
Pit 
Refrig-
eration 
Relief 
valve vent 
header 
-, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
_J 
Refrig-
er at ion MIC 
tank 
619 
--, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
J 
Nitrogen _ _..,__..__ ______ ..__ ______ ~ 
pump 
FIGURE 3. Tank and Safety Feature Layout 
Source: Chemical & Engineering News 3-25 (1985) 
To 
pesticide 
unit 
been removed and not replaced. On the evening of December 2, Tank 610 (from 
which the MIC escaped) contained 40 to 50 tonnes (out of a 60-tonne capacity), 
while Tank 611, adjacent, was thought to contain 15 tonnes, on the basis of ship-
ping records. Later, during the neutralization of residual MIC, it turned out that 
Tank 611 actually contained nearer to 21 tonnes. Tank 619, the stand-by tank, 
contained less than one tonne of "off-spec" MIC, although the level gauge had 
showed it to be about 20% full. 18 Evidently many of the gauges were not working 
properly . 
A routine pipe-washing operation in the MIC unit was started about 10:30 in the 
evening on December 2, just before the shift change. The pipes being washed were 
connected to the tank via a relief valve vent header (RVVH), which was normally 
closed. There were two possible routes, as shown in Figure 2. It appears, however, 
that the RVVH isolation valve was defective. Two other valves that should have 
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FIGURE 5. MIC Scrubber and Flare Tower 
been closed, moreover, had been left open to connect the RVVH line with the pro-
cess vent header (PVH) line. 19 In addition to the valves, a further protection against 
water leakage into the MIC tank via the header is a metal sheet known as a "slip 
blind ," which was supposed to be inserted adjacent to the RVVH isolation valve to 
seal off the rest of the system from the section being washed . According to 
R. Khan, the employee who was ordered to wash the pipe at 9:30 p .m. on 
December 2, the slip blind had not been inserted . 20 S. Qureshi, the MIC supervisor 
on the night shift, later checked the daily maintenance sheet and found no instruc-
tion to insert the slip blind, though there was a note to the night shift to wash the 
pipe.21 
The first sign of possible trouble in Tank 610 was noticed when the night shift 
came on duty at 11 p .m . 22 The pressure gauge in the control room showed 10 psi 
(above atmospheric) as compared to the recommended pressure of 2 to 3 psi. This 
was at the upper end of the so-called "normal" range. The temperature in the tank 
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FIGURE 6. MIC Plant with Scrubber in Right Foreground and Vent Stack in Center 
was also above 20°C. Both the MIC supervisor and the control room operator, 
S. Dey, apparently assumed that the instruments were faulty. 23 In any event, 
nothing was done to follow up their observations . 
At 11: 30 p .m. December 2, the staff in the utility area of the plant noticed a 
slight irritation in the eyes, suggesting an MIC leak, and began to look for the 
source. Small leaks occurred from time to time, and were not necessarily regarded 
as significant. 24 A continuous drip was observed on the outside of the MIC unit, 
however, and one worker, V.N. Singh, reported it to the MIC supervisor, Mr. 
Qureshi, at 11 :45 p.m. The supervisor did not treat the report as urgent, and 
decided not to deal with it until after the next scheduled tea break. 25 At 12 :40 
p.m . on December 3, the control room operator, Mr. Dey, again checked the pres-
sure gauge for Tank 610 and noticed that it was approaching 40 psi . The 
temperature gauge was then reading above 25 °, the top of the scale . At about 
12:45 a.m., loud rumbling noises were heard from the tank . The concrete around 
Tank 610 had cracked-which implies temperatures approaching 400°C-and the 
safety valves ruptured as the pressurized gas escaped in a fountain from the top of 
the vent stack, shown in Figure 6. At 12:45 a.m., the water-washing line (which 
had been running since 10:30 p.m.) was finally turned off by Mr. Qureshi. 26 Gas 
may have continued to escape from the vent stack until 2:30 a.m. on December 3. 
The operating staff never opened the valve connecting Tank 610 to the stand-by 
Tank 619, reportedly because the level gauge already showed it to be partially 
full. 27 The control room operator, Mr. Dey, claimed to have tried to turn on the 
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caustic vent gas scrubber (VGS), but was unable to verify whether it was function-
ing from the control room, shown in Figures 7 and 8. The VGS operator refused to 
check the pump visually unless accompanied by the supervisor, Mr. Qureshi, who 
declined to go with him. The flow meter showed no flow, but he was unsure 
whether the meter was working. 28 Immediately after the accident, it was suL.ggested 
that, in fact, both caustic feed pumps had failed to operate, making it impossible 
to replace the depleted NaOH. 29 This suggestion was later discounted . It was also 
asserted that, if the scrubber had been operated1 even in its depleted condition, it 
could have neutralized up to seven tonnes of the escaping MIC. 30 It is evident, 
however, that the VGS was not designed to handle MIC escaping from the tank in 
massive quantities .31 The rated capacity of the VGS was 86 kg/hr at 35°C and a 
pressure of 15 psi. In fact, the gas was escaping at close to 400°C and over 40 psi 
(the point at which the rupture disk was designed to fail) . Had the VGS been 
operable, the reaction of MIC with caustic soda would have caused further release 
of heat and still greater pressures. 32 In this case, much of the MIC would have 
ultimately escaped through the caustic soda overflow, shown in Figure 4. 
The control room supervisor, Mr. Dey, did not activate the toxic gas warning 
siren until 12:50 a.m. , when MIC was actually seen escaping from the vent stack. 33 
It only remained on for five minutes, although this did alert the police for the first 
time to the fact that "something" was wrong. 34 The external siren was turned off, in 
accordance with established operating procedures, and not turned on again full 
blast until 2:30 a.m., when it was already too late for many people living nearby to 
FIGURE 7. Typical Control Panel (Note Black Fungus on Walls-Evidence of High 
Humidity.) 
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FIGURE 8. Control Room Equipment (Note the Airconditioning unit in the wall and the 
mandatory surge-protection device.) 
escape. 35 The assistant plant manager, S.P. Choudhary, was called at home by Mr . 
Qureshi at 1 a.m. Choudhary ordered the vent flare turned on, but was told that it 
was not operable. (This was just as well . The flare, like the VGS, was not designed 
for a major leak. Had it been turned on, the result would have been a violent ex-
plosion). 36 
The plant manager,]. Mukund, was not informed of the leak until 1:45 a.m ., 
and he heard of it- not from one of his employees - but from the city magistrate. 37 
A system of "walkie-talkies" maintained at the plant for such emergenries was 
never used that night. 38 Telephone calls from the Bhopal police to the plant ap-
parently were answered, but elicited no useful information. 39 By 1 a.m ., most of 
the workers had left the plant, in any case. Mr. Qureshi, the MIC supervisor , was 
unable to find his oxygen mask-someone had removed it. At 1:30 a.m., he ran to 
the boundary fence and broke his leg climbing over it. Mr. Dey , however, remained 
safely in the control room all night until the next afternoon. Four buses on the 
premises, intended to help evacuate employees and I or local residents, were also 
never used that night. 40 
The Cause of the Chain Reaction in Tank 610 
It is now virtually certain that the MIC in tank 610 began a polymerization reaction 
triggered by water sometime before 11 p .m. The heat generated by the reaction 
caused the temperature and pressure to rise. Low-level emissions apparently began 
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about 11:30 p .m., or possibly earlier. The leak reached explosive proportions when 
the valves were ruptured at about 12:30 a.m. Two weeks later (after the remaining 
MIC in Tank 610 had been successfully converted) Tank 610 was opened and a probe 
was inserted . Solid material was found, almost certainly polymer. (Details of its 
composition have not been published.) On the basis of known reaction kinetics and 
thermodynamics, it appears that approximately 1I3 of the MIC must have been 
polymerized. The remainder was volatilized by the heat of the reaction . 41 
The proximate cause was probably water from the pipe washing. The relief valve 
vent header (RVVH) had been temporarily connected by a "jumper" via valves and 
reacted to product MMA, dimethylurea and trimethylbiuret. (The presence of 
these chemicals would constitute a fairly conclusive tell-tale "signature" of water.) 
There are two theoretical possibilities . As little as 0.5 kg of water would quickly 
remove any phosgene present in the MIC by the reaction : 
The resultant HCl might act directly as an initiator for the polymerization reac-
tion . Alternatively, the HCl might have reacted with iron in microscopic flaws in 
the stainless steel of the tank . Thus, far from inhibiting the polymerization reac-
tion, phosgene could conceivably have triggered it. 
Assuming the more straightforward hydration reactions, it would have taken 1. 5 
tonnes of water to produce enough heat to vaporize the 50 tonnes of MIC. 42 This 
could only be accounted for if all the valves between the water hose connection and 
the MIC tanks had been wide open. Another possibility still open at the time of 
writing, however, is that another contaminant of some sort entered the MIC tank, 
either via the nitrogen line or from the scrubber, and catalyzed the reaction. This 
can only be determined by an analysis of the solid material in the tank . 
Design Defect, Management Error, or Operator Error? 
As already noted, several major safety systems (refrigeration, scrubber and flare) 
were not operational on the night of the accident (Figure 9) . A number of in-
struments were faulty , and some valves were not working or were improperly set . 
This may reflect design flaws in the equipment, although operation I maintenance 
failures also bear a share of responsibility. The MIC escaped into the air from a vent 
33 meters above the ground, well above the water curtain. Both the VGS and the 
flare were inadequate to deal with the leak , as noted already . The designers 
evidently did not anticipate an MIC release of anywhere near the magnitude that 
actually occurred . 
In retrospect, at least five categories of improvements could have been incorpo-
rated into the system design . They are as follows : 
• An automatic alarm should have been triggered by rapid changes in pres-
sure or temperature in the tank. This could have alerted the operators earlier-
perhaps early enough to activate some of the other by-pass and/ or protective 
systems more effectively. 
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• All electrical equipment (e.g., pumps) should have been provided with bat-
tery power or effective protection from voltage and frequency excursions. 
• The tanks should have been smaller or the scrubber should have been much 
larger. It could also have been designed to turn on automatically, triggered 
by gas flow. Also a safety interlock system could have been devised to pre-
vent the disconnection of the scrubber and/or the refrigeration unit while 
the storage tanks contained MIC. (This would obviously complicate the 
maintenance problem, however.) 
• A back-up system could have been provided to divert effluent from a 
massive leak into an area that could be flooded with large volumes of water 
and quickly neutralized. (Such a system exists on the Bayer plants in Ger-
many). 
• The MIC tanks probably should not have been encased in concrete. In fact, 
storage drums would have been much safer altogether, since the one 
remedial action that might have helped matters in the absence of the 
refrigeration, scrubber and flare was water-cooling the tank from the out-
side. During the accident, this was impossible. 
There hll.s been much discussion in the media as to whether the Bhopal plant 
design was or was not of the same design as the UCC plant at Institute, West 
Virginia. It was not identical, of course, being a much smaller plant. In fact, detailed 
design was not done by UCC, but by the Indian subsidiary of a London-based 
engineering furn, Humphreys and Glasgow Consultants Ltd., based on a UCC 
"design package." All construction was carried out by Indian firms using Indian 
materials. There has also been comment in the press about a multi-stage "com-
puterized early warning system" that allegedly exists at UCC's West Virginia plant, 
but not in the UCIL Bhopal plant. This appears to be something of a red herring. 
No computer can, under present conditions, take the place of responsible human 
operators on duty. Early warning could have been accomplished by simpler and 
more reliable means. 
In general, electrical and electronic equipment does not function as reliably in 
India as in the US, due to dust, humidity (which causes insulation to deteriorate, 
for instance), and wide and unpredictable fluctuations in voltages and frequency of 
the electric power supply (see Figures 7 and 8) . To rely heavily on electronic systems 
could actually compound the risks unless such systems were consistently protected 
by airconditioning and provided with reliable independent power supplies. 
Management failures that can readily be pinpointed at the operational level in-
clude : 
• The disconnection of the refrigeration system (contrary to explicit instruc-
tions in the UCC manual), apparently to save electricity. 43 
• The decision to operate the MIC unit while both the scrubber and the flare 
were down for maintenance and while jumper valves 1 and 2 were tem-
porarily open and while the bleeder valves were clogged (hence the need for 
washing). 
• The failure to insert a slip blind prior to washing the pipe. This latter may 
be attributable to inadequate training or sloppy procedures in the plant. 
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• Failure to open the valve between tank 610 and the spare tank, 619. 
• Failure to provide clear and adequate warning to the public in the event of 
the accident. Failure to utilize walkie-talkies, buses and other available 
equipment for emergency evacuation use. Failure to provide helpful infor-
mation about protective measures to authorities or to the public. 
The major planning failure, in retrospect, was the failure to imagine a "worst 
case" scenario and to take it seriously. Higher management was too lax in enforcing 
safety related policies, and the plant was not designed to cope with a major leak. 
Communication between the plant management and the Bhopal public was nil. 
Given the fact that nobody in the plant itself died, and the simplicity of the basic 
emergency breathing procedure (a wet cloth over the face), it is particularly hard to 
see why the necessary information was not made quickly available to the public 
authorities and to the people living nearby. Evidently even the supervision level 
employees, such as Mr. Qureshi, forgot what they had been taught under the pres-
sure of the events. 
The typical excuse for secrecy is that firms working with dangerous materials do 
not want to create "unnecessary" alarm and fear. (This was apparently the reason 
for turning off the first alarm after only five minutes.) Alternatively, UCC may 
have been trying to minimize the spread of information about MIC for competitive 
reasons. In the Bhopal case, the consequences of too much secrecy were themselves 
catastrophic. Even the local Bhopal scientific community was ignorant of what was 
being done in the UCIL plant. An effective public information program would 
have been relatively inexpensive. Its complete absence is hard to excuse. Even such 
a simple measure as sending a sound-truck through the streets instructing people to 
breathe through wet cloths would have saved hundreds or thousands of lives. 
A further criticism that might also be made of the UCC management is that they 
went into large-scale production of MIC-based pesticides without having done 
enough basic research on the stability of the chemical. 44 After the accident, when 
there was serious concern about the MIC in Tanks 611 and 619, neither UCC nor 
Bayer definitely knew of an effective inhibitor for the polymerization reaction. 
Top management laxity has also been alleged. A 1982 report by three visiting 
UCC experts, released by Chairman Warren Anderson shortly after the accident, 
noted several safety violations, including the following significant ones: 
• "Filter cleaning operations performed without slip blinding process lines. 
Leaking valves could create serious exposures during this process." 
• "Leaking valves have been fairly common. Team members observed one case 
in which an MIC shut-off valve was leaking so severely that even evacuation 
of the line above the valve was not adequate to prevent MIC release when a 
blind flange was removed . . . . " 
• "It appears that it would be possible to contaminate the tank with material 
from the vent gas scrubber." 
• "The pressure gauge on the phosgene tank was bad ." 
The report was evidently sent to the UCIL Bhopal management in September 
1982. It is unclear what specific actions were subsequently taken on its recommen-
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dations. The works manager,]. Mukund, stated, in an interview with The Times of 
India, that all the improvements called for in the report had been taken care of. 45 
This assessment now appears to have been much too optimistic. 
It is true, as many critics have pointed out, that the parent firm UCC "could im-
pose its will" in general terms and "could veto actions it did not approve of" (if it 
knew of them). No large firm attempts to manage distant plants in detail from 
headquarters; that is what plant managers are hired to do. What the higher level 
managers attempt to do is define policy, define measures of financial performance, 
and define objectives. Managers at lower levels are judged in terms of these things. 
It is virtually certain that UCC did put pressure on UCIL to reduce the losses of the 
Bhopal plant, but quite unlikely that top management would try to specify just 
how this was to be done in any level of detail. There were no American advisers 
resident at Bhopal after 1982. 
UCC was, of course, represented on the Board of UCIL. None of the Directors , 
however , were technical experts, nor were they concerned with operations . Only 
one, an executive vice president of UCC, was based in the US. The others were 
based in UCC's Far Eastern regional headquarters in Hong Kong . Indeed, even 
within the Bhopal plant itself (and in other Indian plants), the disciplinary powers 
of senior management are more limited than is the case in the US. "Social" legisla-
tion in India makes it illegal for an employer to fire employees except in cases of 
"major infractions" of the rules . It is, consequently, more difficult to enforce rules 
from the top down -especially when they appear to be arbitrary and the employees 
are not convinced of their necessity by personal experience. 
It is all the more difficult to enforce rigid in-plant maintenance standards when 
employees live in a society where the electric power system fails several times a 
week,46 the telephone system is always overloaded and on the verge of collapse (as 
it is in Bhopal), spare parts can take months to be delivered, and nobody seems to 
be able to do very much about these things . 
The critical lesson for others may be this : that human beings will not, as a rule, 
pay adequate attention to safety based on statistical evidence of risk alone . People 
generally learn best by experience, as the young child learns not to touch a hot 
stove . People can - and do - learn to behave with reasonable caution so as to avoid 
accidents of kinds they have personally experienced or seen at first hand . This 
stimulus-response mechanism for learning caution depends on feedback between 
accidents and safety related-activities. Study after study reveals that new safety 
regulations in all countries are adopted largely after major accidents - not in ad-
vance of them . Shutting the barn door after the cow escapes seems to be an ir-
remediable human trait . Obviously this mechanism works best in avoiding repeti-
tions of small- to medium-sized accidents that are reasonably frequent, i.e. , they 
have occurred before. Humans seem to be unwilling to be proportionally more 
careful to avoid larger but rarer calamities of kinds they have never personally ex-
perienced . 47 The fact that a complex system has not (yet) failed massively is perhaps 
regarded subconsciously as evidence that it is fail-safe . This, in turn, leads to laxity . 
The Role of Public Authorities 
Government agencies traditionally regulate industrial activities involving hazard-
ous and toxic materials . One obvious and appropriate form of such regulation is 
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land-use zoning. If there is a risk of accident-no matter how remote-people 
should not be allowed to live close to the facility. In Bhopal, the zoning permitted 
residences near the plant. In fact, there was a densely populated slum of squatters 
immediately adjacent to the plant . But most of the squatters had arrived after the 
plant was built (originally outside the city), and Union Carbide had neither the 
responsibility nor the means to remove them. There were many calls in the Indian 
press_for such plants to be built far from cities on barren land . But the fact is that 
city authorities invariably prefer employment opportunities to be near at hand . So 
it was in Bhopal. 
There was a failure on the part of the city and provincial governments in this 
regard . In fact, Bhopal deliberately extended its city limits in 1979 to include the 
plant site . Moreover, in May 1984, Chief Minister Ar jun Singh of the State of 
Madhya Pradesh, of which Bhopal is the capital, retrospectively regularized all il-
legal squatters in the city of Bhopal and made them legal owners . 48 The people 
who lived in the squatter slum near the plant were most attracted to the vicinity by 
the possibility of employment and by the availability of water . 49 
Another traditional form of government regulation is safety and health inspec-
tion. The Bhopal plant design was approved in detail before construction by the 
government of the state, and detailed modification plans were periodically turned 
over to various agencies, such as the Central Electricity Board. 
There is no question that the governmental bodies had access, in principle, to 
qualified experts, though the determination to use their services is in doubt. It is 
the responsibility of the Department of Labor to inspect all facilities for health and 
safety, especially those handling hazardous materials and potentially dangerous 
processes . There were at least six serious accidents at the plant before December 
1984, including a fatal one in December 1982 .50 The latter prompted the state 
government to commission an independent report by Dr. S. Siddiqi, the head of 
the chemistry department of a local science college . The Labor Minister of Madhya 
Pradesh denies having seen the report .51 Inspections appear to have been very few 
and superficial notwithstanding several articles in the local press criticizing safety 
practices at the Union Carbide plant in detail. In fact, the journalist who wrote the 
articles, R.K . Keswani, 52 virtually predicted the accident, but local authorities did 
not respond to his allegations. 
Ultimately it must be the responsibility of government to perform the inspection 
function . It was not performed adequately at Bhopal, if it was performed at all. 53 
Moreover, beyond inspection, it is the government's responsibility to enforce the 
correction of deficiencies . This was not done. 54 The Madhya Pradesh Department 
of Labor has 15 inspectors, based in Indore, responsible for inspecting 8,000 fac-
tories throughout the largest state in India . Only two inspectors were based in 
Bhopal. Each inspector was responsible for visiting over 400 plants per year in 200 
working days, and all travel has to be by public transportation. Given this 
workload, it is hardly surprising that inspections were superficial and enforcement 
minimal. It must be noted also that, relative to some others, the UCIL plant was 
regarded by the inspectors as a model of safety, having had only one fatal accident 
in recent years. 
A third-and less straightforward-role of government is the licensing of prod-
ucts. Ironically, the Central Insecticides Board of the government of India was 
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planning to withdraw Carbary! (Sevin) and Aldicarb (Temik)- both based on 
MIC-from the list of approved insecticides. But the reasons for the proposed 
deregistration related to hazards associated with use, not manufacture. 
This raises an obvious question: Should the federal authorities (in India or the 
US) undertake to register and control dangerous processes per se? It would certainly 
appear prudent to be especially wary of processes involving chemicals that are 
capable of self-sustaining chain reactions (such as explosives), or chemicals that are 
toxic, or both. This question will not be pursued here, since it obviously raises 
many others that would take us beyond the scope of this paper. 
Implications for Legal Fault-Finding 
From unexpected small causes-or unlikely combinations of causes-major conse-
quences sometimes result . The circumstances that permitted the Bhopal tragedy to 
occur- and made it so devastating-would have seemed almost prohibitively 
unlikely until they actually happened. This may explain why so many journalists, 
lawyers and members of the publ}c have apparently adopted a "conspiracy" 
theory55 to the effect that the various errors of omission or commission by various 
parties somehow implied criminal dereliction on the part of higher-level UCIL 
management in India and/or UCC management in the United States. Others may 
differ, but the facts, as we understand them, do not seem to support this notion. 
It seems, however, that the vehemence with which the theory of criminal con-
spiracy has been promoted reflects a related idea that is very widely held. It is that, 
whenever something goes wrong in a man-made system, some person (or firm) 
must be, by definition, guilty of negligence- or worse-and held individually (or 
corporately) responsible. For those who hold this "zero-sum" view of fault, the only 
question to be resolved is the identity of the guilty party and the degree of guilt. 56 
Was the negligence gross or minor? Was there malicious intent? In the Bhopal 
case, it looks increasingly as though UCC is going to be held "strictly liable," essen-
tially for allowing its Indian subsidiary to operate independent of day-to-day super-
vision by US engineers and for manufacturing a toxic chemical in a "less 
developed" country. If these are crimes, many firms must surely be guilty of one or 
both. 
We find this implication disturbing. It is akin to the notion that scientists are 
morally responsible for any and all future uses of their discoveries, no matter how 
perverted. It admits no possibility of innocent miscalculation, confusion, or ran-
dom error. It implies that failure to anticipate every possibility and allow for it is 
tantamount to negligence. It assumes infinite perfectibility of men, organizations 
and machines, and potentially infinite liability for the consequences of imperfec-
tion. 
To be sure, there may very well have been negligence by individuals at UCIL, 
Bhopal, at higher levels in UCIL, and even at UCC. But it also seems quite possible 
that most of the failures had quite innocent explanations. If this is true-or could 
be true- the idea of finding and attributing fault to one party may be fundamen-
tally inappropriate for several reasons. For one thing: If UCC is found guilty of 
"gross negligence" (as various US attorneys for the plaintiffs hope), for "selling 
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something to developing countries when they know it is going to be used in an un-
safe manner", 57 all other parties to the tragedy, including the negligent govern-
ment authorities, are in effect found innocent . Melvin Belli, one of the leading 
plaintiff's attorneys, claims that he hopes "to teach Union Carbide and others 
similarly situated a lesson not to do this again, and to straighten up and fly 
right. "58 More likely, UCC may be forced to spend the next eight years or so de-
fending itself from legal attacks at great cost in money and management time 
(albeit profit for lawyers) and, as a consequence, neglect its fundamental business. 
In fact, this has already happened to a significant degree in the years since the 
accident . 
It has been seriously suggested that multinational corporations should impose 
tougher safety and environmental standards on their subsidiaries in the less 
developed countries (LDCs) than in their own countries, on the grounds that im-
plementation is likely to be sloppy. Were this to be done, it would immediately be 
criticized (justifiably) as a barrier to technology transfer. It is quite clear, in the case 
of India, at least, that low-cost technology transfer has a high priority and that In-
dia is unwilling to accept foreign constraints on its use of imported technology. (In-
dia has refused to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty for precisely this reason.) 
If Belli and his colleagues are successful in the US courts, the most likely lesson 
for UCC and others "similarly situated" will be to pull back sharply from in-
vestments in LDCs like India. This would hardly be in the latter's long-term in-
terest . Such an outcome would, moreover, perpetuate intolerably paternalistic rela-
tionships between "developed" and "developing" countries . 
Implications for Decision-Makers 
It is sufficiently clear from the facts presented that none of the parties- plant 
designers, operators, company management, or responsible public officials-antici-
pated the real possibility of an accident of the magnitude of the one that actually 
occurred . This may seem strange in view of the fact that all the significant compo-
nent elements of the accident had happened repeatedly, including corroded pipes, 
pump failures, leaky valves, staff failures to follow procedures specified in the 
operating manual, systems down for maintenance , and even the major leaks of 
MIC and phosgene which had happened previously one or more times. The adverse 
weather conditions (an atmospheric inversion) were unusual, but by no means un-
precedented . The only "new" factor was the combination of so many systems and 
human failures of various kinds at one point in time. 
In retrospect, it is obvious that major mistakes were made , and some of them 
were certainly avoidable and should have been avoided. This is true in nearly all 
cases of major accidents. But we argue that the implicit conclusion that all mistakes 
are avoidable is unwarranted and questionable . Yet this assumption pervades the 
"human factors" literature. For example, consider the following sentence taken 
from an article by Meister in the Handbook of Industrial Engineering. 59 
Since the worker is merely part of the production system, which has been con-
sciously and deliberately designed, it stands to reason that those who designed 
the system are responsible for any inadequacies occum'ng in it [Meister's italics] ." 
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The same assumption also obviously underlies the legal concept of "strict liability," 
under which hundreds of lawsuits have been filed against UCC in the US courts. 
It is argued here, on the contrary, that while the probability of operator error can 
often be reduced, there is no evidence whatever that it can be eliminated 
altogether, except in a totally automated plant. Even in the latter case, human er-
rors can and will inevitably crop up in fundamental systems design, systems soft-
ware, and systems maintenance. Human errors are fundamentally "caused" by 
human variability, which cannot be designed away. In fact, voluminous research-
motivated by the perceived need to make nuclear reactors "safe" - suggests that the 
inherent probability of error (whether of commission or omission) under the most 
favorable conditions tends to be around 10-3 and certainly higher than 10-4 • 60 This 
can be taken optimistically as evidence that "humans are quite reliable, "61 but it 
also justifies a negative interpretation; it appears that even the most practiced and 
motivated operator will make an error at least once in 10,000 opportunities, and 
probably much more often. Unfortunately, in emergency situations the error 
probability increases sharply. Under extremely difficult or life-threatening cir-
cumstances (as at Bhopal), the probability of human error increases to the order of 
25 % . 62 
One unavoidable conclusion of these facts (as this paper takes them to be) is 
that, while safety factors can be introduced and multiplied, truly "fail-safe" design 
is a contradiction in terms. Accidents will happen, and human error-at some level 
-is almost always the "cause." Two corollaries emerge. One is that every complex 
system involving humans is a candidate for failure. The dependence of present-day 
society on such systems is a form of Russian roulette . (This applies conspicuously to 
military and space systems, which are extraordinarily complex, and correspondingly 
unsafe.) 
The second corollary is that "fault-finding" may be quite inappropriate in many 
cases . This is not to suggest that true negligence is not blameworthy, but that not 
all errors are due to negligence. In the Bhopal case, one might conclude that 
operating the MIC unit without the refrigeration unit or the VGS was negligent . 
Even if both systems had been fully functional, however, it appears likely that the 
accident would have occurred anyhow. It was the untoward combination of plugged 
bleeder valves (#22, #23, #24 and #25 in Figure 2) and open "jumper" valves (#1 
and #2 in Figure 2) that seems to have allowed a large quantity of water to flow into 
the MIC tank. The polymerization and pressure rise might have been somewhat 
slower with the refrigeration system operating, but the MIC would have escaped 
anyhow. Some of it might then have been neutralized by the VGS, to be sure, but 
the accident would still have been very serious . 
The worst error in retrospect was the decision to turn off the "outside" siren after 
only five minutes (according to UCIL policy), rather than allowing it to continue as 
a warning to the community . This undoubtedly cost hundreds of lives . But it was a 
decision made by a relatively low-level employee under extreme pressure where the 
"right" choice was directly contrary to formal company policy. The policy itself was 
wrong, of course, as seen with benefit of hindsight. But this was most likely 
because those who framed it never conceived of an accident of such magnitude. 
Although it is impossible to design perfect fail-safe systems, it is possible to pro-
liferate back-up safety systems, at added cost , to reduce the probability of a 
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catastrophic failure below any specified level. The next and harder question facing 
a manager or decision-maker is "how much safety is 'enough'?". The answer is im-
plicitly provided by human society, in terms of its willingness to divert resources 
from "pure" consumption purposes into safety or environmental protection. 
Economists, in turn, tend to seek indirect measures of the degree of willingness-to-
pay for catastrophe-avoidance and/or compensation. The value-of-life controversy 
is essentially an argument as to how much society is willing to pay to save life under 
various conditions and circumstances. Unfortunately, human societies are extremely 
inconsistent in this regard, so that widely divergent estimates can be found in the 
literature. More direct means of addressing the issue, using decision theoretic 
methods, are now being developed into the emerging subdiscipline of quantitative 
risk assessment or QRA. 63 
The Bhopal example illustrates another problem that standard decision theory 
has not adequately addressed to date. It is the problem of deciding how much "in-
surance" to buy to prevent low-probability/high-liability events. In the standard 
management paradigm, decisions are made among optional investment alterna-
tives, subject to a given distribution of probabilities of gains and losses for each op-
tion. 64 In comparison with even a remote (say, one in 10,000) possibility of a 
billion dollar loss, however, such an investment would immediately be ruled out 
by any rational decision-maker unless he could be sure of being able to buy collecti-
ble insurance to cover the entire liability. 
The fact that UCC may have had a chance in 1984 to increase its liability in-
surance from $200 million to $300 million for an incremental annual premium of 
$36,000 (but declined to do so) suggests what management thought "maximum 
liability" might be . 65 Under hoped-for circumstances, the plant would earn some 
profit (gains), although there is always a risk of taking losses instead. Normally the 
maximum loss that would be considered is the difference between expenditures 
and revenues-at worst, the whole investment might be written off (e.g., in the 
case of an "Edsel"). But the case where profits are limited and the loss can be many 
times the amount of the investment is normally not considered by conservative 
businessmen; it is a completely new feature of the economic landscape. 
A related question is the following: By how much could the probability of such a 
catastrophe have been reduced if a "worst case" scenario had been used as a basis 
for the design? (Obviously this was not done.) And how much would it have added 
to the capital cost? The follow-on question for corporate decision-makers is: Would 
the investment make economic sense if the additional safety factors had to be fac-
tored into the cost estimate? For the government and the public, the question is 
whether the additional safety systems should be mandated by law. A third ques-
tion also arises: whether potential liabilities and costs of avoidance may not have 
grown to the point where certain industries will simply be abandoned by rational 
investors . The nuclear power, chemical and pharmaceutical industries all appear to 
be potentially in this category (not in the near future, perhaps, but in a decade or 
so). Manufacturers are already abandoning manufacture of some pharmaceuticals; 
extreme shortages of certain flu vaccines and whooping cough (pertussis) vaccine 
have occurred because of court decisions imposing liability on the manufacturers 
for side effects that occur in a small number of cases. In the chemical industry, too, 
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it is not inconceivable that large manufacturers will begin to abandon certain pro-
cesses and products altogether. Dangerous processes might then become the ex-
clusive province of small, "fly-by-night" operators with no attachable assets that 
would attract the legal ambulance chasers. 
Even if the above scenario is too apocalyptic, it is apparent that the potential 
economic benefits of investments in plant safety have been grossly underestimated 
in recent years as the financial implications of court decisions based on "strict 
liability" have not been fully appreciated by industry. Chemical companies will 
certainly have to reorient internal resource allocation substantially away from prod-
uct and process R&D and I or capacity expansion and into plant safety. This will not 
be done voluntarily or in the public interest. It will be done because legal depart-
ments and the insurance companies will insist upon it. Technological innovation in 
the affected industries will thus be slowed. 
There are predictable downstream consequences: Chemical firms will earn less 
profit and invest less. They will grow more slowly and create fewer jobs. Consumers 
will lose future benefits they would otherwise have enjoyed. In particular, 
farmers-who depend upon the continuous development of new insecticides to 
replace the ones that insects have developed resistance to -will experience in-
creased losses. In the very long run, these indirect consequences of slower 
technological progress could well outweigh, in human terms, the Bhopal tragedy 
itself. 
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